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The invention, diffusion, and adoption of new technology has long been a
crucial, yet imperfectly understood, feature of agricultural development.
Throughout man's history, agricultural productivity increases have come
about (1) by the diffusion of traditional crops, animals, tools, and
methods into new areas of settlement and (2) by the introduction of
new crops, animals, tools, and methods into traditional agricultural
systems [38]. During the last century, these processes have been accel-
erated by systematic efforts to identify. collect, and diffuse superior crop
varieties,livestock breeds, and production practices throughout the
major agricultural regions of the world. These systematic efforts have
been supplemented by programs of adaptive research and extension
designed to stimulate even more rapid diffusion of the best technologies
from advanced regions and farms to less advanced regions and farms
[6].
Technological advance isparticularly important to producers and
consumers of farm products moving in international commerce. Foreign
exchange earnings from exports of primary agricultural products under-
NoTE: This essayisMinnesota Agricultural Experiment Station,Scientific
Journal Paper No. 67/8. The authors are Assistant Professor. Associate Professor
and Professor, respectively, in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Univer-
sity of Minnesota.
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pin the development programs of many poorer nations. Farm income
and employment in many developing nations are major components
of over-all national economic activity and depend heavily on foreign
ati
sales. On the other hand, consumers in both producing and importing
nations have an important stake in international technological advance.
When gains from innovation are passed along, consumers may benefit
by lower prices and wider selections of food and fiber products.
The purpose of this paper is to examine three cases which provide
caj
some insight into the character of international transmission of technical
change and its economic impacts and implications. These cases focus
ccii
on three separate commodities—sugarcane, bananas, and rice. Each
case presents different facets of the international movement of tech-
nological innovation.
Section I on sugarcane emphasizes the role of experiment station ted
research in the development of new, higher yielding varieties and the
subsequent diffusion of these varieties throughout the sugar-growing pr4
world. An attempt is made to assess the economic impact of the develop- qul
ment of a new successful variety on the innovating nation and upon
later adopters. Section II on the bananas trade illustrates how the devel-
opment and adoption of disease-resistant banana varieties in Central
America led to further innovations in marketing and processing tech- are
niques. The joint impact of these innovations is discussed in terms of
changes in output, prices, and patterns of comparative advantage among
producing nations. Section III on the rice trade illustrates how technical
change in rice production in Japan was transferred to other producing
nations, mainly Korea and Taiwan. The resulting increase in rice exports
from these countries to Japan had substantial impacts on Japanese rice
4
production and prices in the period before World War II. An attempt is
made to measure these effects and to assess their economic implications.
Common threads run through each of these cases. A basic component
of the technical changes examined in each of the three commodities is
the development and diffusion of improved plant materials flowing from beq
both public and private research efforts. In addition, each of these cases
The
illustrates that, in one way or another, the pace of technical advance is
linked to changes in economic incentives as viewed by individual pro-
ducers and policy-making institutions. For each of these commodities,
1
thecomplex web of international economic relationships has diffusedTechnical Change and Agricultural Trade 417
me the impact of a given technological advance far beyond those producers
ntS and nations actually developing the innovation or putting it into practice.
ign
tng I. SUGARCA NE1
Ce.
This section explores the technical changes in sugarcane production
that have resulted from the development and introduction of new sugar-
ide cane varieties. Four stages of progress in varietal development are identi-
cal fled and the relative contributions to varietal progress by the major sugar-
:us cane experiment stations of the world are evaluated. Intercountry and
.ch intracountry transmission of varietiesisassessed and related to the
stages of progress in varietal development. The implications for world
sugar trade of the particular pattern of generation and transmission of
on technical change exhibited in this industry are explored.
he Production and yield data are presented for eighteen major sugarcane
ng producing countries in Table 1.1. In this table, as throughout this paper,
quantitative measures of "sugar" refer to material with 96 per cent sugar
On content. The relative position of a number of countries has changed
considerably over time. The increased importance of production in
a! Brazil and Mexico and the decline in production in Indonesia (Java)
h- are especially striking. The yield data are incomplete, but the substantial
of increases taking place in India, South Africa, the continental United
rig States (Louisiana and Florida), Hawaii, Taiwan, Argentina, and Aus-
al tralia (Queensland) are noteworthy.
The development of new varieties
Ce A study of the history of attempts to improve yields through the
is development of new varieties reveals four important stages.
(S.
nt STAGE I—SELECTION OF NATURAL (WILD) VARIETIES
Prior to 1887 the varieties planted were basically wild canes which had
m been selected over many years by planters in sugarcane-producing areas.
es These wild canes originated in India, New Guinea, and Java, and in
IS most cases, planters relied on a single variety for many years. Occa-
s,
1Theauthors are indebted to Mr. John Gaistad, Department of Agricultural
Economics, University of Minnesota, for assistance in the statistical tabulations and
analyses of this section.
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TABLE 1.1
National Sugarcane Yield and Production Averages for Selected
Five-Year Periods
















































Mexico 163 — 175 30.2 235 20.5
Australia 216 17.3 409 16.8 450 16.9
Philippine Islands 294 — 502 — 96S 20.4
Argentina 194 11.6 260 13.2 410 13.6
Hawaii 567 40.7 614 43.3 951 60.1
United States 311 15.8 229 9.4 149 15.0
Taiwan 192 11.8 450 16.1 869 29.3
South Africa 88 — 181 8.8 312 20.5
Puerto Rico 363 — .414 16.6 795 25.3
Peru 203 22.4 344 24.3 441 40.5
Indonesia 1,513 41.2 1,985 46.53,010 56.4
British West
Indiesb 218 — 231 9.6 348 24.0
Dominican Republic 105 — 231 — 419 —
Mauritius 234 15.6 238 14.5 241 15.2
Egypt 67 1S.S 93 — 123 35.0
Source: Yearbookof Agriculture, USDA,Washington, various
issues,1925-35; AgriculturalStatistics, USDA,Washington. annual
issues, 1936-66; International Situation, USDA.Bureau of Sta-
tistics, Bulletin 30, 1904; ProductionYearbook, FAO,Rome, various
issues, AnnualReport, Bureauof Sugar Experiment Stations,
Queensland, annual reports,1900-64: SouthAfrican Sugar Yearbook,
Durban,1935, 1948-49, 1961-62; InternationalYearbook of Agricultural
Statistics,Rome,variousissues,1910-46:IndianSugar Manual,
Kalyanur,India, 1962, 1963-64.
aExpressed in short tons of low-gradegur.
bCOuntriesincluded are Antigua, Barbados, British Guiana, Trini-



















Technical Change and Agricultural Trade
STAGE 11—CROSSING OF VARIETIES
In 1887, in the newly founded experiment station in Barbados, British
West Indies and in the experiment station in Java, sugarcane seedlings
2Thecane sugar industry was a key part of the colonial empires of the nine-
teenth century. Slavery in the British West Indies was also integrally related to
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sionally planters experimented with new varieties but, generally speak-
ing, the only varieties that survived over time were those resistant to
the diseases prevailing in the area of production. Techniques of cultiva-
tion, irrigation, and processing were well developed in most producing
countries by 1887, and sugar was an important world trade commodity
by that time.2420 CaseStudies
were first produced through a process of sexual reproduction[5,40, Pla
34]. This was of great importance since it opened the possibility of 4001
crossingvarieties. The cane plant ordinarily does not flower and pro-
othet
duce seedlings readily. Flowering in the cane plant is induced by tern-
sin
perature and light control, and few experiment stations were successful




Several experiment stations had notable successes in the development
of the first new varieties. The Java station (Proefstatien Oost Java) was
thefirst to develop a new variety (P.O.J. 100) of commercial impor-
tance. It later added many more important varieties. Hawaii and Bar-
ifl
bados had also developed important commercial cane varieties by 1900.
STAGI
TheCoimbatore experiment station in India released the first of its Co.
Th varieties in 1912. This station and the Java station were destined to
th
e
develop varieties that would be planted commercially in every major
cane-producing area of the world by 1930.
lhofl
this
STAGE Ill—BREEDING FOR DISEASE RESISTANCE in a
Sugarcane disease did not diminish in importance with the introduction nical,
of the first new varieties. In many countries, the new varieties which about
yielded substantially more than the traditional native varieties were stockl
invaded by diseases within a few years.5 The Java station took the lead Ma
in developing disease-resistant varieties. In 1921 the variety p.o.j. the
2878 was produced. Its grandparent was the first important Java variety,
P.O.J. 100. P.O.J. 2878 proved to be resistant to most important cane
diseases and to be a high yielding variety as well. More than 50,000 Africj
acres were planted to this variety by 1926—a remarkable expansion in
Tal. 'Priorto that time cane plants reproduced asexually except for rare instances
of sexual reproduction in wild canes. Asexual reproduction is still the means of
reproducing all commercially grown cane. Portions of the cane plant (usually the
upper portion of the stalk) are planted, and new plants grow from these segments.
The opportunity to reproduce cane both sexually and asexually is important majozi
in sugarcane breeding. A successful cross between two cane plants may produce tina a
numerousseedlings. A single superior seedling can be reproduced asexually and .
createa completely new variety. Testing and selection of superior seedlings from
thousands of candidates is a major activity in modern cane breeding. Airl
This problem continues to plague cane breeders. Modern varieties tend to 1940 undergo a deterioration in yield capability after several years of commercial pro-
duction. New diseases continually make inroads on the old varieties [5].Technical Change and Agricultural Trade 421
40, plant material from a single seedling in 1921. By 1929 more than
of 400,000 acres were planted in Java, and it was being planted in many
ro- other countries. This "wonder cane" became the most widely planted
rn- single variety in the world.
fill In the period from 1920 to 1940 the Coimbatore station in India
also produced a number of important varieties which incorporated
disease resistance and high yield. These varieties were planted widely
ent throughout the world. Varieties developed in the British West Indies
vas (Barbados) and Hawaii were also planted extensively outside the regions
or- in which they were developed.
ar-
)0. STAGE IV—BREEDING FOR SPECIFIC SOIL AND CLIMATE CONDITIONS
The latest phase in the development of new varietal technology involves
•to the breeding of varieties suited to the specific soil, climate, disease con-
jor ditions, and cultivating techniques of small regions. For the most part
this breeding must be undertaken by the experiment station or stations
in a specific region. The scope for international transmission of tech-
nical change through varietal transfer is limited. However, information
ch about breeding techniques and the potential of certain varieties as parent
stock have been exchanged, as have genetic materials.
ad More than one hundred sugarcane experiment stations now exist in
the world. Almost every important cane-producing country is now using
ty, locally developed Stage-TV varieties. This is illustrated by the data in
ne Table 1.2. The development of Stage-IV varieties in Queensland, South
Africa, Puerto Rico, and Louisiana is reflected in the percentage of
in acreage planted to locally developed varieties in these areas.
Table 1.3 shows the relative importance of the major varieties of
sugarcane in the world during the 1940—64 period. The production
he figures are estimates of the over-all importance of each variety in the
major countries of the world during the twenty-five-year period. Argen-
ice tina and the Philippines are the only major producing countries not
included in this calculation.
Almost all the major varieties during this period were bred prior to
1940.Most are examples of the third stage in breeding progress. The
widespread planting of the Java (P.O.J.) and Indian (Co.) varieties is422 CaseStudies
TABLE 1.2
Per Cent of Sugarcane Acreage Planted to Varieties Developed by the
Experiment Station of Selected Areas: 1930—65
Area 1930 1910 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965
Flawaii 50 65 82 100 100 100 100
Queensland 20 20 33 51 83 S5 S5
Taiwan — 32 46 56 10 4
Louisiana 0 23 52 77 65 65
Puerto Rico 0 9 12 tO 3 35 50
Ninuritius — 8 53 98 93 7S —
South Africa 0 0 0 :3 49 73
Source:Annual Report,Bureau of Sugar Exreriment Stations.
Q uec'nsland. Australia, various issues, 1928-1964; Proceedings of the
Twelfth Congress, International Society of Sugarcane Technologists,
New York, 1967. pp. SOT, 1041; Culture of Sugarcane for Sugar Produc-
lionin Louisiana, USDA Agriculture Handbook 262. D.C.,
1 96-1.
evident. Barbados, the British West Indies station, and Hawaii also have
produced varieties which have been used extensively in other countries.
Only one native variety, Badila of New Guinea, had any commercial
importance during this period. The P.O.J. 2364 variety was never a
significant commercial variety, but it was important as a parent to
P.O.J. 2878 and several other varieties.
Table 1.4 indicates the importance of the Coimbatore and Java stations
in the generation of new varieties. The Java station has been especially
productive of parent and grandparent varieties. Almost all the parent
and grandparent varieties were produced in Java, Barbados, India,
Hawaii and British Guiana—the successful Stage-il and -UI stations. A
number of additional stations such as Cuba, Canal Point (Florida),
Queensland, South Africa, Taiwan, Mauritius,6 Brazil, British Honduras,
Puerto Rico, and Peru are now important in producing varieties as a
result of Stage-IV activity.
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Internationaltransmission of varietal changes
the Reference to Table 1.3 indicates that the varieties of the major Stage-Il
and -III stations were in commercial production in many countries other
than their country of origin. What is not obvious, however, is that the
experiment station itself was an important factor in the international
— transmissionof the P.O.J., Co., Hawaiian, and British West Indian
00 varieties.
S5 The South African case is instructive in this regard. The sugar indus-
try in South Africa began in 1849. Prior to 1880 several wild varieties
— importedfrom Java, Mauritius, and India were cultivated. A wild
50 variety, Uba, was introduced in 1883 and proved to be more disease
— resistantthan the other varieties. For a period of fifty years it was the
principal variety grown.
Some experimentation was carried on by planters to find new varieties
he during this fifty-year period. A number of potentially important Stage-Il
tS, and-III varieties actually existed. However, it was not until an experi-
ment station was financed by the growers and established at Mt. Edge-
cumbe that these Stage-Il and -III varieties from Java and India were
introduced. From 1925 until 1945 the accomplishments of this station
we were entirely confined tothe introduction of new disease-resistant
es. Stage-Ill varieties, mostly from Java and India.
ial The percentage of the South African crop consisting of these new
a varieties rose from 3.3 per cent in 1933—34 to 95.5 per cent in 1942—
to 43, nine years later. An analysis of yield increases indicates that up to
1945 the new varieties introduced outyielded the old Uba variety by
ns about 27 per cent.7
By 1947 the experiment station had produced its first South African
nt variety, N:Co. 310 (the first N:Co. varieties were bred in India but the
Ia, selections for commercial planting were made in South Africa). As
A This calculation adjusts for shifts in European and non-European grower per-
centages and a reduction in the number of ratoon crops (crops grown from the
regrowth of the cane plant after cutting—as many as five or six ratoon crops
were grown). Since yield declines with the number of ratoon crops harvested, an
a adjustment was made for the differential age of the Uba cane being phased out
and the new varieties being planted. The ratooning, of course, saves the expense































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Technical Change and Agricultural Trade 427
shownin Table 1.3, this variety came to be commercially produced
in four other countries, most notably in Taiwan (a rarity for a Stage-IV
cane variety); and from Table 1.2 it can be seen that it, along with
several additional N:Co. varieties, occupied 78 per cent of the planted
acreage in South Africa by 1960. A yield comparison over a five-year
period of the N:Co. varieties with the Stage-Ill varieties from India and
Java, which they substantially replaced, showed a 28 per cent advantage
for the locally bred canes.8
The South African experience with respect to the international trans-
mission of the Stage-Il and -III varieties (especially from Java and
India) was repeated in most cane-producing countries which had not
developed Stage-TI and -III varieties. The experiment stations in Queens-
land, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, Mauritius, and several other countries were
instrumental in the testing and introduction of these varieties into their
local economies. The exhaustive collection and testing of varieties from
other countries also served to provide a basis for the development of
breeding programs in these newer stations.
In more recent years the Stage-IV varieties have dominated produc-
tion in most countries, but only a limited number of these varieties are
transferred to other countries. An important element of international
transmission of technological change remains, however. Genetic materials
such as newly selected seedlings, collections of wild canes, and parent
stock varieties of proven merit are freely exchanged between stations. In
addition, the technical knowledge regarding improved breeding tech-
niques, superior genetic parent stock, and more efficientselection
methods is exchanged.
intracountry transmission of varietal changes
The South African case again is informative regarding the adoption
of new varieties within a given sugar economy. The organization of the
industry in South Africa is similar to the organization in a number of
countries. Most planters have large acreages (200—1,000 acres) with
substantial capital investment. Planters have highly structured relation-
ships with the processing mills and are well organized. As one would
C
8 The 28 per cent is calculated from actual yield comparisons of old and new
varieties under similar production conditions.428 CaseStudies
expect in South Africa and in most other countries, the organizations of
planters which support the experiment stations a opt the new varieties
developed by these stations rather quickly. This rapid adoption is
heightened by a sense of international competition in achieving corn-
parative advantage in sugarcane production.
In South Africa the variety Co. 331 was introduced in 1946—47 and
reached its highest proportion of planted acreage (25percent) just
eight years later. N:Co. 310 was introduced in 1948—49 and reached
its maximum proportion of planted acreage (60 per cent) nine years
later. Given that the average age of old cane when ploughed out and
replanted in South Africa is now six years, this would seem to be
extremely rapid adoption. In fact, planters altered their usual cropping
pattern in many cases by ploughing out old cane varieties earlier than
usual in order to plant new varieties.
In Australia, each of the varieties, 050, Pindar, Trojan, and P.O.J.
2878, reached a maximum proportion of planted acreage (25 per cent)
approximately ten years after introduction. In Puerto Rico, BH 10-12,
introduced in 1920, reached a maximum proportion of approximately
25 per cent fifteen years later. However, PR 980, a locally bred variety
introduced in 1955, had reached a proportion of almost 50 per cent by
1965.
This rapid adoption of new varieties does not necessarily hold for
all sectors of the su'gar-producing economy. The Indian and native plant-
ers in South Africa produced yields only two-thirds as high as the Euro-
pean planters' yields in 1959. Planters with small holdings in Java and
other countries also have lower yields than the estate or plantation
planters. This is not necessarily a consequence of slower adoption of
new varieties.India, a country with many small growers, has also
experienced relatively rapid adoption of varieties. For example, in 1960
varieties Co. 527 and Co. 449 accounted for 6 per cent and 1 per cent
of the acreage of Andra Pradesh. Seven years later the proportions were
14 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively [18].
Changes in sugar trade
Table 1.5 presents trade data for sugar. It should be noted that












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table 1.5
A1
Source:Yearbook of Agriculture, USDA, 1925-35; Mauj
AgriculturalStatistics, USDA, Washington, 1936-66; International Year- ran
book of Agricultural Statistics, Rome, various volumes 1910-46. cx aExPOrtsare positive numbers; imports are negatk'e.
b1994
per
With the exception of limited trading of beet sugar between Eastern
COu
European countries, world trade figures reflect movements of cane sugar. or
Volui The beet sugar production is important in the trade picture because
virtually every beet-producing country has instituted a tariff or quota
system, or both, to protect the domestic beet industry. The cost of such
protection is high and has increased in recent years because of the rela- ship
tively more rapid technological advances in sugarcane production.
Much sugar is traded under specific agreements between cooperating
b countries. Prior to 1961 the largest importing country, the United States, eet
imported the bulk of its needs from Cuba, the largest exporting country. 9
Since1961 this U.S.-Cuban trade has ceased. The United States has
both'
allocated Cuba s former quota to other countries. Cuba has shifted her Prior
exports to Communist-bloc countries. The United Kingdom, the world's
second leading importer, also has agreements with several exporting
countries, and
From time to time, international sugar agreements have been nego-
tiated among countries in an attempt to control trade and production. to cu
They have been only partially effective. The "free" world market for
sugar often has been a residual "dumping" market, and price changes of an
have been volatile, the c
Tables 1.1 and 1.5 suggest a relationship between changes in sugar-
cane yields and changes in quantities exported by the major exporting struc
indusj countries. Five exporting countries, South Africa,India, Australia, other
Argentina, and Taiwan, had yield increases ranging from 32.5 per cent menti
to 41 per cent between the five-year, 1948—52, average and the ten
year, 1958—67, average. These five countries increased their average
annual exports by 4,069,000 short tons of sugar in this period. This
increase in exports was 103 per cent of the 1950 average production in
these countries.Technical Change and Agricultural Trade 431
Asecond group of six countries, Philippines, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia,
Mauritius, and the Dominican Republic, experienced yield increases
ranging from 10 to 20 per cent in this period.9 Their average annual
exports increased by 2,079,000 short tons, 44 per cent of their 1950
average production. Only the Philippines had an export increase (65
per cent) on the order of magnitude of any of the five high-yield-increase
countries. Cuba, on the other hand, experienced an actual yield decline
em for the same period and displayed an almost constant average export
ar. volume."
.tse This evidence supports the contention that shifts in comparative
)ta advantage have been reflected in the world sugar trade. This relation-
.ch ship is apparent even though world sugar trade has been dominated by
Ia- (1) intercountry agreements, (2) shifts in the position of competing
crops, and (3) changes in the degree of protection offered domestic
ng beet sugar industries."
es,
ry. Indonesia (Java) experienced a yield decline after the 1930—40 period and
tas sharp export reduction beginning in the 1930's and continuing until 1950 when
both yields and exports began to increase. Many factors account for this pattern.
ter Prior to the late 1930's Java was second only to Cuba as a sugar exporter and
i's ranked third in production behind Cuba and India. Java and Hawaii had the
world's highest sugarcane yields in the 1930's. Today yields in Java are less than
ng half those of Hawaii. Java was acknowledged to have the world's most efficient
and modern processing industry in 1930. The depression of the 1930's coincided
with relatively high production levels for sugar (to a considerable degree induced
by Java-bred canes). Java as the world's major "free" market supplier was forced
n. to cut back exports substantially in 1933. She was not favored in the International
or Sugar Agreement developed at this time. Aware of the expansion in world supplies
as a result of the Java varieties, the government attempted to prevent the release
es of any new varieties outside of the country. War and Japanese occupation followed
the depression. Many of the processing mills were destroyed during this period.
From 1945 to 1949 internal revolution took place. This was partially directed
r- against the sugarcane-producing industry which was an integral part of the "dual"
structure which existed prior to the war. As a result, by 1950 the processing
a industry was almost entirely destroyed, cane fields had reverted to jungle and
other crops, and what surely was one of the most outstanding agricultural experi-
It ment stations in history was closed [5, 9, 34, 40,
"Cuba is the only major cane-producing country to have a relatively weak
experiment station. Only two commerically produced varieties have originated
there. One of these, coca, isof unknown parentage and was produced by an
is unknown breeder [44].
"Factors other than varietal change will affect yields, of course. Yield increases
often are due to the interaction of increase in fertilizer use, irrigation, and other
inputs with new varieties. Itis difficult to measure the extent to which the yield
changes were due to new varieties, but it would appear to be the major factor.I
432 CaseStudies
Benefits from technological change in the production of sugarcane shot
The yield increases due to new sugarcane varieties have been sub-
stantial and have afforded great benefits to producing and consuming
.1 countries. The allocation of these benefits to the economic activity
wa
which produced them is difficult for several reasons. As this paper has
dud
shown, several different types of activity have been involved. The
and
development of the Stage-IT and -III varieties has clearly been impor-
tant. These benefits must be allocated between the research effort which
thevarieties and the research, testing, and extension effort
A
which speeded up their international transmission to countries other wha
than the originating country.
The early Stage-TI varieties were transferred easily, and little formal
economic activity was associated with their transfer. New cultural prac- and
tices were not required. Information regarding the relative profitability coth
of producing the new variety was required, but informal information left,
channels were available through growers' organizations to facilitate this 1
transmission. Producer organizations have been keenly aware of their was
competitive position in world sugar trade and of their relative corn- moi
parative advantage. This is one reason that substantial private effort to ove
obtain information about new varieties took place. It also explains why gen
in most countries producers have been willing to finance their own suil
experiment stations privately.12 of I
Stage-Ill varieties were more difficult to transfer because knowledge and
about specific disease resistance was required. Many new experiment
shifi
stations (as well as the established stations) contributed to the transfer aisci
ofthese Stage-Ill varieties. In South Africa, as we have seen, the intro- yjell
rem
duction of Stage-Ill varieties from other countries increased average of I
yields by 27 per cent. If one wished to attribute this yield increase to
the experiment station efforts, a handsome return to such investment
could be calculated.'3 But only part of the value of this yield increase '4
case
12 Most experiment stations for other agricultural crops have not been privately coni
financed because producer groups have been too difficult to organize and no mdi- 11m4
vidual producer is large enough to capture the benefits from research. asI
13 All sugarcane research costs in the South African experiment station to 1945 chO1
(the ending of the data from the period of introduction of Stage-Il and .111
varieties from other countries), accumulated at an interest rate of 6 per cent,
amounted to 830,782 Rand. After subtracting seed costs associated with the new met
varieties, a stream of annual benefits can be calculated from the supply function Ifl tTechnical Change and Agricultural Trade 433
should be attributed to the experiment station effort since the varieties
would eventually have been adopted without it. Also some of the experi-
ib- ment station effort was an investment in a Stage-IV breeding program.
tng The Stage-IV cane-breeding activity is somewhat more straightfor-
ity ward in terms of the allocation of benefits. Each station typically pro-
las duces varieties planted only in the region where the station is located,
'he and shifts in the production function and supply curve yield benefits to
the producing country which can be attributed to the breeding effort of
.ch the local station.14
An additional complication is added to the assessment of benefits
ter when one considers the possibility that international transfer of tech-
nology means that an experiment station may not only shift the
ial production and supply functions of its own economy, but the production
LC- andsupply functions of other economies as well. Thus, the exporting
ity country's own demand function for exports will shift, probably to the
On left.
is The Java station
was the leading generator of new varieties from 1900 to 1930. During
most of this period, Java was enjoying an increasing relative advantage
to over other producing countries, including India, which was also a leading
hy generator of new varieties, but whose own varieties were often better
Vn suited to other tropical countries than to northern India where much
of her production was located. A "technology gap" had been created
ge and reached its widest point around 1930. Yet Java was particularly
flt
shift using a technique developed by Griliches [12]. These measured annual benefits
er also were accumulated at 6 per cent to 1945. Assuming no further increases in
yield, an annual flow of benefits was calculated by assuming the 1945 yields to
remain constant and adding to this flow 6 per cent of the accumulated benefits as
ge of 1945. The resultant annual benefit flow was 2.47 times the accumulated research
to costs of 1945. This could be interpreted as a 247 per cent rate of returns to
investment in research. But, for reasons discussed above, such an interpretation
may not be correct [1, 8, 7, 11, 39].
se 14Jfone makes the same calculations and assumptions for the South African
case as in footnote13, except for the 1945—60 period when the station was
ly contributing Stage-IV varieties to the economy, the annual benefit flow is1.2
Ii- times the accumulated costs to 1960, This might more legitimately be interpreted
as a 120 per cent rate of return to investment in research. Of course, if one
45 chooses to express this as an "internal" rate of return, it would be much lower.
II The assumption that yields would remain constant is not fully justified. Yields
tend to decline over time with new varieties. Even after making additional adjust.
ments of this sort, we would have to conclude that the South African investment
in research has yielded a very high return.I
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susceptible to the demand effect of this international transmission of
her own varieties because of her position as the major free-market
supplier. The demand for sugar declined in the early depression years and
and Java bore the brunt of the reduction in world trade.
II. BANANAS'S
One of the most dramatic episodes in the long history of banana
production and trade in the Central American tropics has been the
development and international diffusion of new technologies in response
to the devastating inroads of the Panama disease in bananas. In the T1
twenty-year period following World War II, two major technological
developments stand out. The first is the selection, diffusion, and adoption (Cd
ofdisease-resistant banana varieties. The second is the invention and FDA
application of processing and handling techniques specifically designed
to accommodate the physical and economic attributes of the new
varieties.
q
The economic impact of this episode on other exporting nations
whose banana farms and plantations were not ravaged by Panama
disease illustrates side effects that can occur when important techno-
logical change directly affects only some producers of an internationally and
traded commodity. third
The postwar setting
During World War II, international trade in bananas shrank drastically
because of the extreme shortage of refrigerated, ocean-going ships. But, the
as Table 11.1 indicates when shipping became available after the war,
banana production and exports rebounded quickly, attaining prewar
levels by the 1948—52 period, andi
Banana exports from Central America dominated the world trade on
15Muchof the background material for this sectionis drawn from H. B. to th
Arthur, J.P. Houck and G. L. Beckford, Tropical Agribusiness: Structures and by fa
Adjustments—Bananas, Harvard Business School, 1968. That study as well as ofci this discussion relies heavily on data kindly provided by private trade sources,
especially United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit and Steamship Company. Cenq
Professor H. B. Arthur of the Harvard Business School offered helpful suggestions oulpi
on this section of the paper.Region 1935—39194S—521953—57195S—62
Central America6 I.130.21,157.9 .120. 1I .221.31101.7
South 425.4 532.S 97 l.S1.124.41,739.6
Rest of the World 716.1 640.6 953.51,328.0 1.78 1.9
Total 2,30:2.02.3313:3,0.IS.43980.24,92:3.2
So urce:Poo ciand Agriculture Organization, United Nations
(CCP StudyGrouponBananas);ForeignAgriculture Circular,
EDAP-l-67, FAS, USDA, October 1967.
Inc:lucles prtIiminarv data for 1967.
bCostaRica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama.
Colombia, l3razi 1.
picture, accounting for about half the total during the period 1948—52.
Most of these Central American shipments went to the United States
and Canada. (At this time the United States purchased about two-
thirds of all the world's banana exports.) But largely because of rising
banana production in Ecuador, South American exports surpassed their
prewar levels in the 1948—52 period.
International banana prices were relatively high in this period, and
the stage seemed to be set for orderly and profitable growth in the
world banana market. United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit and
Steamship Company, the two major, fully integrated, banana producing
and marketing firms operating in the American tropics, resumed activities
on much the same basis as before the war by reactivating and adding
to their war-idled resources. These two U.S. firms—United Fruit was
by far the larger—had operated plantations, export facilities, and a host
of community services (roads, railroads, schools, hospitals, etc.)in
Central America since the early 1900's, and their combined banana
output accounted forall but a small portion of Central American
----
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TABLE 11.1
of
:et World exports of Bananas from South America, Central America,
and the Rest of the World; Five-Year Averages: 1935—39 to 1963—67









production.'6 Together, United Fruit and Standard Fruit held 90 per defij
cent to 95 per cent of the U.S. import market during the period 1948—52. of
Over the years, these two companies, especially United Fruit, had .
conductedlong-range research programs on banana production and
marketing technology. The financing of these continuing programs has
varied over time as circumstances in the industry have changed. But AT11
the research done by these firms is both basic and applied. In fact, pu
much of the world's scientific and practical knowledge about bananas Mi
has been generated by these privately sponsored research programs.
IS
Panama disease cli
Bananas are subject to a host of deadly plant diseases. Although
most now can be controlled, several diseases, at one time or another,
have threatened the very existence of large areas of commercial farms
and plantations. For example, in the 1930's the rapid spread of sigatoka fronj
disease, a wind-borne, leaf-destroying fungus, decimated large banana and
tracts in Central America. It threatened to wipe out the whole industry.
However, frantic research, mainly by United Fruit Company technicians, as
uncovered an effective treatment based on periodic applications of regic
Bordeaux mixture suspended in water [25, p. 154]. By 1939, most large Ecul
banana plantations were equipped with elaborate, permanent networks effed
of pipes and spray facilities.17 In Mexico, where large-scale sigatoka parti
control was not undertaken, partly because of the small size of individual
banana farms,this disease virtually killed off the banana industry prad
by 1950.
But no really effective treatment has yet been found for Panama BI
disease. This soil-borne fungus (fusarium wilt) invades the soil, attacks CenI
the root system of the susceptible plant, and causes a breakdown in had
the vascular flow of water and nutrients [37, Chap. 13]. The result is land4
stunting and eventual destruction of the infected plant. Though Panama very
disease spreads more slowly than sigatoka, the organism remains in- 925,1
Pana
16 Private producers tied to one or the other of the major companies through
production contracts, credit arrangements, and disease control programs are con- averi
sidered as part of company production for this discussion. Fruzi
17 Further research and field experience has shown that sigatoka control can be inst achieved throubh application of either an oil-based or a low-volume organic
fungicide spray delivered by aircraft or knapsack sprayer. This development, 25,01
occurring in the 1950's, has eliminated the need for the cumbersome water-spray had
installations of the earlier era.Technical Change and Agricultural Trade 437
definitelyin the soil, rendering infected areas useless for future production
per of susceptible varieties.
2. Panama disease does not attack all varieties of bananas; some are
. . . .
d
highly resistant. However, the Gros Michel variety is quite susceptible.
h
This variety is the traditional commercial banana of Central and South
But America. Its handling, ripening, and flavor qualities have long been
prized by banana men. But it has not been possible to develop a Gros
Michel banana with disease resistance. Because, botanically, the banana
is a giant herb growing from an underground rhizome, crossbreeding
and other known techniques of producing new varieties with selected
characteristics of existing varieties are very difficult to apply.
h Efforts to "purify" infected acreage by flooding it with water for
e8r periods up to a year have proven only temporarily effective. This
technique, known as flood fallowing, is very costly and provides immunity
•ka from reinfection from only one to five years, depending on soil type
na and other environmental factors.
Panama disease was identified and widely known in tropical America
as early as 1900. Its spread was gradual but inexorable throughout the
region's banana lands. By World War II only a few areas, notably
ge Ecuador and Colombia, seemed relatively free of the disease. Since no
ks effective treatment could be found, the spread of the disease was
ka partially offset by abandonment of infected areas. New plantings were
ial then established on previously uncultivated sites. This was a workable
ry practice until the period after World War II when banana production
began to exceed prewar levels.
By the 1948—52 period, Panama disease was pervasive, especially in
ks Central America. Relocating and replanting whole farms and plantations
in had become prohibitively costly. In addition, good disease-free banana
is land, accessible to existing handling and shipping facilities, was becoming
very scarce. United Fruit Company has estimated that since 1900 some
925,000 acres of banana land have been abandoned, mostly because of
h
Panamadisease. This averages about 14,000 acres per year. These
average annual abandonments amounted to about 10 per cent of United
Fruit's owned and controlled banana acreage in the early 1950's. For
instance, United Fruit's Quepos Division in Costa Rica had about
25,000 acres in banana production in 1947. By 1956, Panama disease




Officials of both United Fruit and Standard Fruit were extremely
reluctant to consider abandoning the Gras Michel banana, even though
the ravages of Panama disease had reached a critical stage and research
on feasible control methods was not especially promising.
The critical stage
The period 1948—52 was the start of the critical stage in the Central
American banana industry's confrontation with Panama disease. From
this period into the middle and late 1950's the area's banana production
and exports dropped. The data in Table 11.2 indicate the downward iod
slidein acreage from 1948—52 to 195 8—62, and the stagnation in Central
American exports in this period is indicated by the data in Table 11.1.
Abandonments, due principally to Panama disease, exceeded replantings
in three of the four major producing countries—Guatemala, Honduras,
and Costa Rica. Only Panama showed increased acreage. There, a
12,000-acre flood fallow and replanting program was begun by United
Fruit Company in 1950. This experiment was designed to revive one
of the company's plantations which had lain idle since Panama disease
wiped out production in 1936.
The charts in Figure 1 show banana exports for these four nations
annually and as a five-year moving average for about forty years.'8
TABLE 11.2
Areas of Cultivation of Exportable Bananas in Central America:
Five-year Averages 1948—52, 1953—57, and 1958—63
(thousands of acres)
Country 1943—52 1953—57 1953._63
46.7 39.3 31.3
honduras 55.3 53.5 1:1.5
Costa Rica .12.3 39.0 30.6
19.2 26.0 30.3
r\Ote:Major companiesand their associated only.
$ourcc':Datasuppliedby major fruit companies.
18 During this period, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama accounted
















Volume of Banana Exports from Four Central American Countries, 1925—64
(metric tons)
I I I I I I ' I I I I I I
354045505560 1925 30354045505560
The drop in exports that can be attributed almost entirely to inroads
of Panama disease is shown between the vertical dotted lines. Even in
Panama, where the production and export trend generally increased
ugh
arch
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Note: Breaks in Panama and Guatemala indicate that no informationis
available for the relevant period.
Source: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
p.
—p440 CaseStudies
in the 1950's, a major export drop occurred between 1950 and 1952
as the flood fallow and replanting program got underway.
As Central American production faltered in the 1950's, Table II.!
shows that exports from other sources expanded substantially. Banana
exports from South America, Ecuador and Colombia, are most relevant
in this expansion, because almost all the other major banana exporters
operate under the protection of preferential arrangements with major
importers (e.g., Jamaica and the Windward Islands with the United
Kingdom, Guadeloupe and Martinique with France, the Canary Islands
with the Spanish mainland). The dramatic surge of Ecuadorian and
Colombian banana shipments to replace lagging Central American
exports is shown in Figure 2.
As mentioned previously, both Ecuador and Colombia produced
mainly the Gros Michel variety but were relatively free of Panama
disease inthis period. Colombian bananas were shipped mainly to
Western Europe, and up to two-thirds of Ecuador's exports came to the
United States where, by 1959, they accounted for over 40 per cent of
all U.S. banana imports. Ecuadorian bananas easily filled the gap left
by the dwindling supplies and rising costs of Central American bananas.
Growing markets, abundant land,and government encouragement
fueled this tremendous growth in output. The major banana companies,
United Fruit and Standard Fruit, participated in this Ecuadorian expan-
sion mainly as shipping and marketing agents—United Fruit's single,
small producing division in that country was expropriated in the early
1960's. Since then, the Government of Ecuador has effectively discour-
aged the formation of additional foreign-controlled plantations.
A number of smaller exporting and marketing firms, operating with
Ecuadorian supplies, flourished during this period. As a result, the
combined U.S. market share of the two producing-marketing companies
dropped to about 70 per cent in 1959. Ecuadorian banana quality was
uneven; seasonal variations in output were sharp. In addition, an export
tax was levied, and shipping charges exceeded those for Central
American fruit. Yet the demand for Ecuadorian bananas surged ahead
as the Central American producers struggled with Panama disease.
During the early portion of this critical stage it seemed likely that, and
barring a massive Panama disease outbreak, Ecuador soon might corner

























and elsewhere. Without a major cost-reducing shift in banana production
technology, the invested capital, land resources, production knowledge,
and skillin quality control of the integrated companies in Central
Ecuador
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America might become virtually worthless. Moreover, an important all
source of vital foreign exchange and tax revenue for the four Central rest
American nations would wither.'° The companies and their host govern-
ments were in trouble with bananas, and they knew it. V
Resistant varieties: selection and adoption
Although the Central American trade was built on Gros Michel
'S
bananas, a number of Panama-resistant varieties were known to scientists
an
and grown commercially in other areas. The banana industries of
Jamaica, French West Indies, Canary Islands, Australia, and others,
were based on resistant varieties belonging to the Cavendish group.
ne
These varieties had been shunned by the major producing companies ty
because of supposedly lower yields,poorer handling and ripening of
qualities, and somewhat different management requirements. Another wh
important factor, no doubt, was simply resistance to change within the
companies. The firms' producing, shipping, and marketing divisions
knew precisely how to grow, transport, and merchandise Gros Michel. lard
Much would have to be relearned if new varieties were adopted.
Resistance to a variety switch gave way faster in the smaller Standard
Fruit and Steamship Company, due perhaps to a major management
theexistence of smaller disease-free land reserves wezi
under company control in producing areas. By 1957, Standard had 14
planted fourteen to fifteen thousand acres in bananas of the Cavendish
group. These varieties were selected by researchers from those available
in the Caribbean, Africa, and elsewhere. Over time, Standard Fruit for
researchers focused their attention on one of these varieties, the Giant
Cavendish. coal.
In 1960, United Fruit Company botanists began to look seriously
atadisease-resistant variety called the Valery, a member of the wen
Cavendish group, which was being grown on the firm's experimental
farm in Honduras. This plant had been collected originally in Vietnam the
by a company expedition several years earlier. In 1962 a major company to
decision was made to move rapidly into Valery plantings. Even with
the problems of multiplying and distributing new seed stock, virtually
19In1955—57, bananas accounted for 13, 34, 54, 72 per cent of export revenues
h for Guatemala. Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama, respectively (see Table 11.4).
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all production by Standard and the majority of United's was in disease-
rtant resistant varieties by 1965.
Once begun, the adoption and diffusion of Giant Cavendish and
'em- Valery bananas spread quickly. However, this pattern of development
and rapid diffusion of disease-resistant varieties should not be interpreted
as a clear indication that rapid technical change in tropical agriculture
is most likely in sectors or industries dominated by large plantations
chel and vertically integrated firms capable of internal research and develop-
tists ment. The diffusion process in the Central American banana case was
of indeed rapid. But the long delay by the managements of the major
ters, companies in selecting, adopting, and marketing resistant strains was
)UP. nearly disastrous for them. On the other hand, the shift to Cavendish-
flies type bananas already had occurred in the West Indian banana industries
ling of Jamaica, Windward Islands, Guadeloupe and Martinique—areas
ther where small holders and public research facilities predominate.
the Diffusion of Giant Cavendish and Valery bananas in Central America
.Ofls was spurred not only by the monolithic decision structures of the two
hel. large firms but because of several unexpected advantages with the new
fruit which were not apparent at first. As the new varieties were put
ard into commercial production in the Central American lowlands—probably
ient the world's best over-all banana-growing environment—per acre yields
yes were higher than anticipated and even higher than Gros Michel yields.2°
Heavier bunches and higher planting densities contributed to this
tish yield advantage. Because the new varieties are lower growing, the
ble constant danger of losses due to "hlowdowns" is reduced below that
for the lankier Gros Michel plants.21 Though it had always been generally
• ant assumed that the Gros Michel was the best-tasting banana in world
commerce, some test results in the United States in the early 1960's
showed that properly handled and properly ripened Valery bananas
the were distinctly superior in flavor and aroma to Gros Michel.
However, the skeptics had correctly foreseen a major problem with
the new varieties. Bananas of the Cavendish group were not well suited
to the commercial methods of handling and shipping then in use. In
ith 20Theterm "new varieties" is not meant to suggest that the adopted varieties
fly were genetically or botanically new. They were simply new to commercial produc-
tion and export from these areas.
ues
21Themajor companies expected to lose an average of 20 to 25percent of
4). their mature Gros Michel banana plants annually due to blowdowns.444 Case Studies
the 1950's and early 1960's bananas from Central and South America
were still handled as whole stems (bunches) from the moment of
-
harvest until ripening was completed in the importing country. mdi-
vidual stems, protected by only a thin plastic film bag, were handled prd
up to a dozen separate times en route to the wholesale fruit dealer. The to
Gros Michel is well suited to this system. However, the individual
in I
fingersof fruit on the new varieties are more easily bruised in the
an
green stage than are the Gros Michel. Furthermore, the banana clusters
th
on the new varieties do not lie as close to the stem's center stalk as
on the Gros Michel. Hence, they are more easily damaged. With all
of
the handling of exposed stems built into traditional techniques, quality I
controlwith the new varieties was very difficult in comparison with
the established Gros Michel.
When the first yields of the new varieties were coming onto the
North American market, Standard Fruit Company encountered severe
quality problems. Outright rejections on arrival were quite high. In
addition, prices for the new variety fruit were discounted by wholesale seil
buyers because many banana quality problems do not show up until
n
the fruit is fully ripened and ready for retail Standard's carl
response to these quality-control problems probably saved the company
cou
and set off a market-induced technological shift that is revolutionizing
banana handling in virtually all international markets.
Tropical boxing
During the reign of the Gros Michel in Central and South America,
almost all shipments to North American and European markets were of
cargoes of stem fruit. Bananas remained on the stem until the ripening b
process was completed in local markets by specialized ripeners, whole-
sale fruit jobbers, and chain stores. These establishments, of which the.
there were about 1,600 in the United States in 1955, also cut the Grq
individual clusters (hands) from the stem, packed them in returnable
cartons, and merchandised them to retailers. So, in addition to ripening imu
and retail distribution, these firms performed an important sorting, faCj
grading, and packaging function.
Grq
22Legalrestrictions prevent the major importing companies from operating e their own ripening and distribution facilities. An ownership transfer occurs for
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In the early 1960's, Standard Fruit began to experiment with the
t of system of cutting, washing, sorting, and packaging individual clusters
mdi- into 40-pound, labeled, cardboard boxes in the tropics near their
died production and shipping facilities. The boxed fruit was then shipped
The to wholesale buyers in the importing country. Under this system, ripeners
dual in the importing country relinquished the cutting and packing functions
the and part or all of the sorting and grading function, but they retained
sters the ripening and retail distribution functions.
as Acceptance of this innovation was unexpectedly rapid in many parts
of the U.S. market. Boxed bananas are more easily handled with the
ality typical rail, truck, and warehouse machinery, and the new variety fruit
with is less likely to be bruised in boxes. Like all other firms in the food-
marketing sector, ripeners and jobbers were under severe economic
the pressure to become larger and more efficient. With boxed bananas,
vere they found that they could reduce per unit costs by eliminating a
fl series of labor-intensive processes and increase the volumes handled.
sae In addition, retailers were pleased with the nonreturnable, one-way
I cardboard carton. From the producing company's viewpoint, more fruit
anS could be salvaged all along the way than under the old system where
wholestems had to be discarded if a single cluster was damaged or
g had become prematurely yellow. Moreover, the specialized loading and
unloading equipment at the seaports was still usable, with some modifica-
tion, for boxed fruit. Further experience has shown that boxed bananas
ica can be stowed more efficiently in refrigerated cargo ships, and elimination
of the center stalk, which is about 15 per cent of the weight of stem
Ling bananas, reduces the shipping costs per unit of usable fruit.
ole- The demand by wholesalers for boxed bananas grew so rapidly in
the United States that United Fruit Company, which was still shipping
the Gros Michel in 1962, was forced to develop its own tropical boxing
tble facilities even before its Valery production began. Smaller independent
ting importers, buying on the Ecuadorian market, began to establish boxing
ing, facilities in and near the producing regions in order to supply their
U.S. customers with boxed fruit, even though their bananas were also
Gros Michel variety. Table 11.3 shows that in a matter of only four
tog years boxed bananas went from an insignificant portion of the U.S.













Source:Estimated from data supplied by major importers.
The trend toward tropical boxing of export fruit is being accelerated
in Ecuador. In response to new inroads of Panama disease in Gros
Michel plantings,the Ecuadorian government has prohibited new
plantings of this susceptible variety [43, p. 2fl. Only varieties from
the Cavendish group may be used for new farms or for replanting
existing farms.
Standard Fruit Company adopted the tropical boxing technology in
order to offset quality and handling problems stemming from its earlier
decision to adopt the disease-resistant variety, and, as a result, United
Fruit and the others adopted the boxing technology much earlier than
they would have had to on purely technical grounds. The economic
impact of the boxing technology on retail and wholesale channels
required Standard Fruit's competitors to begin tropical boxing in order
to maintain their previous market position. Several intermediate produc-
tion processes—cutting, sorting, and boxing—shifted from the developed
importing nation to the less developed producing and exporting nations,
and new box-making plants came into operation in Central America
and Ecuador. Furthermore, the nature of the actual product moving in
international commerce was altered from an essentially unprocessed
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Economic impacts of innovation
An economist looking at the impact of the disease-resistant varieties
in Central America could argue that, as Panama disease spread through
the region, the production function for bananas based on traditional
inputs shifted slowly but surely downward. Output per unit of the usual
inputs eroded at all levels of input application. The main objective of
early decisions to adopt new varieties seems to have been to halt this
erosion of the function and to stabilizeit, even if stabilization was
achieved at lower output levels than with Gros Michel. But as the
resistant varieties were adopted in the lush Central American banana
zone, experience suggested that the production function might be restored
to predisease levels and perhaps even beyond them. The extent of this
shift is not yet fully known. However, it seems likely that the adoption
of new varieties will result in a net increase in the production function
for Central American bananas as compared with the disease-free Gros
ted Michel output relationship.
ros The erosion of banana production relationships in Central America
ew throughout the 1950's no doubt strengthened Ecuador's comparative
advantage in banana production and export. This shift in comparative
ng advantage was accelerated by deteriorating production relationships
and prices for Ecuadorian cacao and by the slow growth of that
in nation's coffee-producing industry [46, Chap. 2]. Much of the banana
ier boom in Ecuador during this period can be attributed to this alteration
ed in comparative advantage vis-a-vis Central America. Adoption of new
an varieties has apparently halted this trend and, in fact, may be instru-
mental in restoring Central America to its preeminent position in the
els world banana trade.
ler Tropical boxing of bananas was undertaken initially to facilitate the
ic- shiftto new varieties. The objective was to maintain quality and reduce
ed waste and transit loss. In effect, the boxing of bananas near the produc-
is, tion area was at first a method of sustaining the production function, in
ca terms of output of marketable fruit, at levels higher than otherwise would
in have been the case. The rapid adoption of this new technique in the
producing areas where Gros Michel still rules indicates it is a net cost-
Ct reducing procedure for bananas moving into the relatively sophisticated
marketing channels of North America and Western Europe.
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Some calculations for 1963, when stem and boxed bananas shared
the U.S. market about equally, indicate that on an equivalent basis
v
and in terms of usable fruit, boxed banana import prices received by
major importers were about 13 per cent higher than stem prices. About
$1.00 per hundredweight of the approximately $10.00 of value added
to boxed bananas from harvest to retail was transferred from establish-
ments in the United States to establishments in producing areas.23
Though this is only a rough approximation, it does indicate that in terms
of foreign exchange earnings and jobs tropical boxing is a significant BaJ
international shift in handling technology. Pe$
The development of box-making and assembly plants in the producing
areas, though still in its early stages, can be expected to increase employ- Ba
ment and economic growth in those areas. New capital for banana Pe
carton factories in Central and South America ran above $50 million Hon
in the period 1960—66. This added industrial activity is a direct result
of the adoption and diffusion of the banana-boxing technology.
It is clear that the resurgence of the Central American banana industry
in response to these two major innovations—the shift in production to
new or improved varieties and the tropical boxing technology—has
slowed down and altered the growth and development of the Ecuadorian
industry. The export data illustrated in Figure 2 indicate this began to
occur in the early 1960's. A slowdown of the growth in export volume
and continued downward pressure on world prices have resulted in a FunJ
stagnation in Ecuadorian banana export earnings since about 1963.
Banana exports and earnings for Colombia, the other major South
American supplier, continue to show only slow growth as Central
American boxed bananas become more and more competitive in the offs
European markets which have been Colombia's major outlets.
The data in Table 11.4 show the exchange earnings and relative mail
importance of banana exports for Central America and Ecuador in new
three periods: 1955—57, 1959—61, and 1964—66. The growth in other
Ecuadorian export industries reduced that nation's dependence on
bananas somewhat since the peak period in 1959—6 1and helped to
imp(
Thisassumes that the availability of both stem and boxed fruit from the and relatively open market in Ecuador kept import prices reasonably close to corn-
petitive levels, all bTechnical Change and Agricultural Trade 449
tred TABLE 11.4
asis Valueof BananaExports and Per of Total Exports Accounted



















Banana exports (mu. dollars) 26.1 20.1 28.6
Per cent of total exports :34 25 2-1
Guatemala
Banana exports (mu. dollars) 15.5 15.3
Per cent of total exports 13 14 3
Honduras
Banana exports (mil. dollars) 34(1 :31.4 5:3.1
Per cent of total exports 54 .16 44
Panama
Banana exports (mildollars) 24.3 20.6 37.S
Per cent. of total exports 72 67 48
Ecuador
Banana exports (mil. dollars) 63.1 90.1
Per cent of total exports 50 62 52
me Source:international Financial Statistics, Intt-.rnational Monetary
Fund, \'ols. 15, 17, and 21, and U.S. Department of Aericulture, Foreign
Agriculture Service.
apercentagesare based on three-year totals.
offset the shift of comparative advantage in bananas back to Central
America. Banana earnings in the 1960's generally increased for all the
major Central American exporters except Guatemala. However, some
new Valery plantings by United Fruit Company in Guatemala are
beginning to produce marketable fruit. They will partially offset previous
abandonments caused by Panama disease.
Dependence upon bananas for foreign exchange, while still extremely
important for several of these nations, especially Ecuador, Panama,
and Honduras, declined for all these countries after 1959—61 and for












of the future growth in the production and boxing of bananas would
be focused in Honduras, Panama, and Costa Rica, because these nations
seemed to provide the best over-all environment for the production of
disease-resistant varieties and the packing and shipping of boxed a
bananas to world markets.24 Both United Fruit and Standard Fruit
were engaged in major production-expanding programs with disease- in i
resistantvarieties in Honduras. United Fruit, the only major exporter as
of Panamanian bananas, was expanding Valery output on its fully-owned in
plantations. In addition, United was being relatively successful with an in4
expanding associate producer program in Central America. (Associate prij
producers grew bananas under contract with United Fruit Company.
They received basic services, facilities, and credit from the company, Ani
but had to follow specified production practices laid out by the company.) leal
Substantial expansion of production in Costa Rica was being planned, add
especially by Standard. pri4
Banana prices in several major importing nations drifted downward [rd
after the late 1950's. Retail prices in the United States, Canada, and
West Germany have dropped about 10 per cent since 1958; "real" roig
prices of course dropped further [42, p. 22], [41, p.8]. Increased
supplies due to the new varieties and the adoption of tropical boxing
have intensified the long-run tendency for supplies to increase faster
than demand, so that at least part of these price declines can be
attributed to technological changes as well as to increased plantings and
better management. Measuring the price impact of these changes is
difficult, but perhaps the following suggests the magnitudes.
FAO projections of world banana supplies for 1965—70 foresaw an ted
increase of about 40 per cent in the period [26]. Approximately one- of
third of this increase will come from Central America. If it is assumed imp
that Central American production would remain constant (or possibly Jap
decline) in the absence of the technical innovations discussed here, then the!
the effect of these additional supplies on international banana prices Jap
is an approximate measure of the price impact of technical change in
this area.Itis only an approximation, of course, and probably an Jap
overestimation since export supplies from other sources, principally
There are other economic and political considerations which also favor
banana expansion in these countries, but they are beyond the scope of this dis- thisi
cussion. stadTechnical Change and Agricultural Trade 451
,uld Ecuador, probably would have expanded faster in the absence of Central
ons American competition than they actually will. In any case, the additional
of supplies from Central America in the last half of the 1960's will exert
xed a downward pressure on retail prices approximately equivalent to 20
ruit per cent of 1965—66 levels. That is, in the absence of any expansion
ase- in Central America and assuming all other export availabilities remain
rter as projected, the retail banana prices in world markets would average
ned in 1970 some 10 per cent below 1965—66 levels. When the projected
an increase in Central American supplies is added, then average retail
jate prices some 30 per cent below 1965—66 levels are required to balance
ny. amounts demanded with projected export availabilities [26, Table 111.4].
Any supply response to these lower prices naturally would offset at
y.) least some of this indicated downward pressure on retail prices. In
ed, addition, itis likely that consumers will benefit not only from lower
prices but also from the expected rise in average banana quality resulting
ard from the increased use of tropical boxing in most markets.
md As in the past, economists and historians will continue to debate the
al" role and contribution of the banana industry to the growth and develop-
sed ment of tropical America. Their analyses will have to encompass the
ing long-run impacts of the diffusion and adoption of these two inter-




In this section 25anattempt is made to analyze the complex set of
an technical and economic interactions associated with (1) the diffusion
ne- of Japanese rice production technology to Taiwan and Korea, (2) the
ted impact of productivity growth in rice production on rice trade between
bly Japan and Taiwan and Korea, and (3) the impact of rice imports from
Len these two colonial areas on rice prices and production in metropolitan
Japan. Specifically, we will test two hypotheses advanced by several
in Japanese scholars:the transfer of rice production technology from
an Japan to Taiwan and Korea was responsible for the expansion of exports
fly
25Theauthors are indebted to Yujiro Hayami, Ramon H. Myers, James I.
Nakamura, and Henry Rosovsky for review and criticism of an earlier draft of
us- this section of the paper and to Aida Recto and John Sanders for assistance in the








Source:Saburo yamada pp. 371-413.
from the colonial areas to metropolitan Japan; these exports in turn
depressed rice prices and dampened the growth of productivity and
farm income in metropolitan Japan.26
An alternative hypothesis which might be advanced is that the technical
potential,in the form of biological and chemical innovations, for
continued rapid technical advance in Japanese agriculture was not
36"Theyears after 1920 were difficult years for Japanese agriculture. Cheap
ricebegan to be imported from Korea and Formosa, where rice cultivation had
been encouraged by the Japanese government following the food shortage of
World War I and the rice riots that resulted in 1918" [36, p. 334].
452 Case Studies
TABLE 111.1
Annual Growth Rates of Output1 Inputs, and Productivity in
Japanese Agriculture: .1882—1957











Cross output 1.78 .80 —2.79 4.51
Netoutput 1.37 .69 —1.78 2.14
Conventional inputs
Total inputs .28 .28 —.03 1.41
Labor .20 .01 1.83 —1.36
Fixed capital
Including building .43 .52 —.46 1.70
Excluding building 1.66 1.24 —1.44 3.62
Variable inputs 2.93 1.15 —6.76 12.02
Land acreage total .60 .15 —.54 .35
Paddy field .27 .34 —.43 .31
Upland field 1.02 .05 —.67 .39
Productivity per unit of
Conventional inputs 1.49 .49 —2.77 3.05
Labor 1.86 .81 —4.54 5.84
Fixed capital
Including building 1.34 .27 —2.35 2.76
Excluding building .11 —.44 —1.37 .85
Variable inputs —1.12 —.45 4.25 —6.71
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created during the interwar period. This hypothesis apparently has not
been seriously examined in Japan.






The rate of output and productivity growth in Japanese agriculture
has varied widely during the one hundred years of "modernization"
following the start of the Meiji period in 1868. As outlined in Table
111.1,four main periods, sometimes called "technical epochs," are










I<oku Per Tanof BrownRiced
Period
1873—77 — — 1.501)1.6001.700
1878—82 1.166 1.264 1.5191.636 1.72 1
1883—37 1.297 1.355 1.599 1.743
188892 1.423 1.425 1.651 1.7091.764
1893—97 1.371 1.371 1.7051.7471.786
1898—11)02 1.516 1.516 1.7601.7861.808
1903—07 1.626 1.626 1.817 1.S261.831
1908—12 1.734 1.734 1.8761.8671.854
1.843 1.843 1.9371.9081.877
1918—22 1.927 1.927 2.0001.9501.900
Annual average PerCent
growth rate 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.2
of Agriculture and Forestry, Agricultural Forestry Econo-
mics Bureau, Statistical Section, Reported by Nakamura [27; pp. 66,
228-30].
Ohkawa, et al., Estimates of Long Term Economic Statis-
tics of Japan Since 1868, Vol. 9, Tokyo, 1963, p. 67.
c[97;p. 92].






Paddy Rice Yields in Japan, 1873—1922; Five-Year Averages of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a period of rapid growth in output and productivity that ended during
the 1920's. This was followed by a period of slower growth during the
interwar period. The third was a period of decline and recovery asso-
ciated with World War II. A fourth period of explosive growth in
productivity began in the late 1940's or early 1950's [15, 20, 31, 35,
47].
Output and productivity trends both for rice and for the total agricul-
tural sector appear to have followed the same general pattern, reflecting
the dominant role of rice in the agricultural economy.27 The growth in 1873
output during thefirst"technical epoch" was achieved through a 1883
combination of increases in land inputs and of growth of land produc- ISS3
tivity. Yield increases (land productivity) accounted for approximately 1803:
two-thirdsof the growth of output and were achieved primarily 1803
through intensification of the "traditional" biological technology; that is,
1903
(1) improved crop husbandry, including more intensive use of labor,
(2) increases in the application of organic sources of plant nutrients, Sc
(3)application of pre-Mendelian methods of crop improvement—
-n
primarilythrough selection rather than breeding, and (4) land improve- ado1
ment projects—principally the replanting of paddy fields and improve- first
ment of water delivery and drainage systems [31, pp. 388—409]. rose,
Institutions for the rapid diffusion of superior varieties and cultural 187(
practices used by the best farmers and in the best regions were
developed during the 1880's. This effort was complemented by the sive
development of prefectural (local) experiment stations in the 1890's.
By the end of this first period, the research effort was increasingly
focused on the development of a "fertilizer-consuming rice culture."
This involved the development of rice varieties with shorter stems and
more tillers. The application of the more intensive rice production tech-
nology was facilitated by small-scale land and water resource develop-
ment, which contributed to the expansion of the irrigated area and meth
increased the precision of water treatment. In
27 The general pattern described above has been challenged by Nakarnura that
[27,28]. Nakamura argues that agricultural production was underestimated at and
the beginning of the Meiji period and that the gradual improvement of production
estimates between the mid-1870's and the early 1920's has inflated the rate of two-
output and productivity growth during the first "epoch." It appears that Nakamura's
criticisms are stimulating review and revision of the "official" estimates. However, -
theserevisions will not destroy the generalizations about the four broad "epochs"
UnSUC
described above. For further discussion of this issue see [15, 22, 29]. relati
.4Technical Change and Agricultural Trade 457
TABLE 111.4
.lring
the Average Price indexes for Brown Rice and the Genera! Price



































IS7S—S2 92.7 110.9 0.8:3
1883—87 57.9 S 1.0 0.71
ISSS—92 71.8 88.9 0.80
1893—97 100.0 100.0 1.00
IS9S—1902 129.9 127.3 1.02
1903—07 156.6 152.6 1.03
1908—12 175.1 164.2 1.06
Source: Ogura[31], p. 21.
Theeconomic factors for the expansion of the rice area and the
adoption of yield-improving technology were favorable throughout the
first epoch, so that, as shown in Tables 111.4 and 111.5, real rice prices
rose. By 1900 rice exports, which had risen continuously since the early
1870's, started to decline. Demand was increasing more rapidly than
supply. The Japanese government's response was to undertake an inten-
sive program to expand rice production in the northern island of
Hokkaido and in the newly acquired colonial areas of Korea and
Taiwan.
Outputand productivity growth in KoreaandTaiwan
Initialeffortsto increase rice production in Korea and Taiwan
through the transfer of Japanese rice varieties and Japanese cultivation
methods were relatively unsuccessful.28
In Korea, where the environment for rice cultivation was similar to
that in Japan, the transfer of Japanese varieties was rather successful
and rapid. Table 111.6 shows that by the early 1920's approximately
two-thirds of the rice area in Korea was planted to Japanese varieties.
28 Early efforts to expand rice production on Hokkaido were also relatively
unsuccessful. It was not until after World War II that efforts to achieve high and
relatively stable average yields were successful in Hokkaido [31, pp. 319, 435—78].TABLE III. 5
Price Indexes for Rice and Wholesale Price Index in Japan: 1911—40
(1934—36= 100)
Wholesale RicePrice (I) RicePrice (2)
Price Index Ratio Index Ratio
Index (G) (R1) (R1/G) (R2) (R9/G)
Year
1911 61.0 60.2 .99 60.5 .99
1912 64.6 72.0 1.11 72.2 1.12
1913 64.7 74.9 1.16 74.8 1.16 •
1914 61.8 56.1 .91 56.4 .91
1915 62.5 45.4 .73 45.6
1916 75.6 47.5 .63 47.7 .3
1917 95.1 68.3 .72 69.1 .73
1918 124.6 113.0 .91 113.4 .91
1919 152.6 159.6 1.05 160.1 1.05
1920 167.8 153.9 .92 154.5 .92





1922 126.7 121.6 .96 122.6 .97
1923 128.9 113.4 .88 113.0 .88 •
1924 133,6 133.8 1.00 133.7 1.00
1925 130.5 144.5 1.11 145.0 1.11
1926 115.7 130.6 1.13 131.1 1.13
1927 109.9 122.0 1.11 122.9 1.12
,,
1928 110,6 107.2 .97 107.1 .97
1929 107.5 100.7 .94 100.9 .94
1930 88.5 88.0 .99 64.1 .72




1932 83.0 73.3 .88 73.6 .89
1933 95.1 74.5 .78 74.5 .78
1934 97.0 90.5 .93 90.5 .93
1935 99.4 103.1 1.04 103.2 1.04




1937 125.8 — — 112.2 .69 1
1938 132.7 — 119.2 .90
1939 146.6 — — 129.6 .86
1940 164.1 — — 150.7 .92
Average
1911—20 93.0 85.1 .91 85.4 .92
1921—30 118.2 116.9 .99 114.8 .97
.
Food





Source:Wholesale Price Index: Hundred Year Statistics of the
Japanese Economy, Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, 1966, pp.
76,77; Rice Price (1): Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1949, p. 634
—
indexbase has been shifted from 1900100 to 1934-36 z100;Rice
Price (2): Hundred Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy, Statistics
Department, Bank of Japan, 1966, p. 90.
IHowever, as seen in Table 111.7, rice yields in Korea did not increase
significantly until at least the mid-1920's.
In Taiwan the direct transfer of Japanese varieties was not success-
fuL Japanese rice varieties were not adapted to the Taiwan ecology.
Technical Change and Agricultural Trade
TABLE 111.6
Plantings of Japanese-Type and Ponlai Rice Varieties in













































Plantings of Japanese-Type Varieties
Korea
1912 39 3 1.160
1917 590 41 1,354
192:2 979 67 1,458
1927 1.163 77 1,633
1932 1,245 80 1,504
Plantings of Ponlai Varieties
Taiwan
1422
a 1st Cr01) .4 .2
—1,t49
2nd crop — 1,420
1926
let crop 111.8 45.2 1,644
2nd crop 11.4 3.9 1,573
1930
1st crop 80.4 30.6 1,883
ncl c'rop 54.9 16.6 1,624
1935
crop 186.9 64.8 2,243
2nd crop 118.0 32.0 2,057
Source: Takekazu Ogura[31], p. 190; Jepan Statistical Yearbook,
Tokyo, 1949, pp. 630, 631; Taiwan Food Statisrics, Taiwan Provincial
Food Bureau, 1965 (and earlier issues), Taipei, pp. IS-22.













































1912—13 1,630 1,405 1,160
1913—14 1,816 1,445 1257
1914—15 2,120 1,472 1,440
1915—16 1,927 1,185 1,297
1916—17 2,090 1,506 1,387
1917—IS 2,053 1,516 1,354
1918—19 2,294 1,535 1,494
1919—20 1,906 1,525 1,250
1920—21 2,232 1,543 1,447
1921—22 2,149 1,519 1,415
1922—23 2,252 1,545 1,458
1923—24 2.276 1,538 1,480
1924—25 1 ,9S3 1,563 1,269
1925—26 2,215 1,572 1,410
1926—27 2,295 1,575 1,457
1927—28 2,595 1,589 1,633
1928—29 2,027 1,505 1,346
1929—30 2,055 1,619 1,270
1930—31 2,877 1,648 1,746
1931—32 2,381 1,661 1,434
1932—33 2,452 1,630 1,504
1933—34 2,729 1,783 1,531
1934—35 2,508 1,698 1,477
1935—36 2,683 1,681 1,596
1936—37 2,912
• 1,588 1,833
1937—38 4,020 1,926 2,473
1938—39 3,621 1,646 2,200
1939—40 2,153 1,225 1,758
Average
1912—13to
1919—20 1,980 1,486 1,330
1920—21to
1929—30 2,208 1,557 1,413
1930—31to
1939—40 2,833 1,618 1,755
Source:JapanStaistical yearbook,Tokyo, 1949, pp. 630, 631.TABLE 111.8




























































































































































































































































Source:Taiwan Food Statistics, 1964, Taiwan Provincial Food
Bureau, Taipei, 1964, pp. 2-3.
Furthermore, the official economic policy of the Japanese administration
in Taiwan emphasized expansion of sugar production rather than rice
production during the first two decades of the colonial period. It was not
until the mid-1920's, after thirty years of Japanese rule,that new
varieties were developed. These varieties incorporated the high yield
potential of the Japanese varieties with the superior adaptation to local
conditions of the native indica varieties.29 By the late 1930's half of the
29 The early Japanese efforts to improve rice yields in Taiwan emphasized
selection and diffusion of the highest yielding native indica varieties. In spite of
a large reduction in the number of inferior varieties grown and substantial diffusion
of superior varieties, the average yield showed only modest gains. Early efforts to
introduce japonica varieties from Japan were not successful. Even after substantial
modificationinculturalpractices,the highyield potentials of the japonica
varieties were only partially realized under Taiwan conditions. Efforts were then
directed to breeding varieties which combined the desirable characteristics of the
introduced japonica varieties(highfertilizerresponse,short growing period,
nonsensitivity to photo-period, and better quality) with the resistance to disease
and the superior adaptation to the local ecology of the native indica varieties. The
new varieties developed in Taiwan using japonica genetic materials are referred
to as ponlai (or horai)varieties.
The first ponlai variety was introduced commercially in 1922 when it was
planted on 414 hectares in the Hsinchu region. An exceptionally high yield of
2,517 metric tons of brown rice per hectare was achieved. Later the planted
areas were increased and extended to the Taipei and Taichung regions. With the
diffusion, average yield declined. After 1925 an outbreak of rice blast disease,
to which the new varieties were highly susceptible, sharply reduced the ponlaiTechnical Change and Agricultural Trade 463
totalrice area in Taiwan was planted to the new ponlal varieties devel-
opedin Taiwan. The average Taiwan rice yield was approaching that in
Japan. This rapid diffusion was facilitated by extensive irrigation develop-
(ield ment. g./ha.) . . .
Bythe mid-1920's, the increases m rice output m the colonial areas
resulted in substantially increased rice exports to Japan (Table 111.9).
Japanese rice imports rose from an average of 559 metric tons, 6.4 per
1,281 cent of total Japanese supply, in 1912—20, to 1,754 metric tons, 15.6
2
per cent of total supply, in 1931—40. During this latter period, imports
1,37 from Korea accounted for 9.6 per cent and from Taiwan 5.5 per cent
1
of the total Japanese rice supply.
In Taiwan, according to Table 111.10, rice exports rose from an
930 average of less than 20 per cent of total production during the 1911—20
period to 31 per cent in 1921—30 and 47 per cent in 1931—40. In Korea,
1 Food as we see in Table 111.11, exports rose from less than 9 per cent in
19 12—16 to 30 per cent in 1922—26.
The extent to which the increased rice exports from the two colonial
tration areas were a result of economic incentives generated in the market or
tfl rice administrative pressures has not yet been analyzed. Although data on
ias not consumption levels in the two colonial areas are subject to considerable
.t new question, it does seem clear that consumption of rice in Korea and
tyield Taiwan declined while exports to Japan were rising. As shown in Table
) local 111.12, in Taiwan, the per capita supply of rice available for local use
of the declined from 166.5 kilograms per capita in 1920—29 to 133.1 kilo-
hasized grams in 1930—39. In Korea, per capita consumption of rice also
;pite of appears to have declined sharply while exports to Japan were rising. In
contrast, rice consumption in Japan during the 1930's approximated
stantial the levels of earlier years.
iponica
re then
of the Impact of rice imports on Japanese prices, production, and productivity
pod, The two decades from 1920 to 1940 have been characterized as a
CS. The period of relative stagnation in Japanese agriculture. For thirty years
eferred prior to World War I, rice prices had risen steadily relative to the gen-
it yields. Beginning in 1930 other pon!ai varieties with greater resistance to the
ield of rice blast disease were introduced. Over twenty years had elapsed between the
planted introduction of thefirst japonica varieties and the development of the ponlai
ith the varieties which possessed sufficient advantage over the local varieties to justify








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rice Supplies, Trade, and Domestic Utilization in Taiwan:
1910—li to 1939—40





Per Cent of Pro-
ductionImportsTotalzationExportsProduction
1910—11 641 13 654 560 94 15
1911—12 578 18 596 503 93 16
1912—13 732 30 762 601 161 22
1913—14 658 11 669 583 86 13
1914—15 684 9 693 567 126 18
1915—16 664 11 675 564 111 17
1916—17 691 17 708 591 117 17
1917—18 662 48 710 559 156 23
1918—19 703 57 760 591 169 24
1919—20 692 27 719 615 104 15
1920—21 711 21 732 586 146 21
1921—22 778 47 825 718 107 14
1922—23 695 15 710 531 179 26
1923—24 868 18 886 624 262 30
1924—25 920 117 1,037 682 355 39
1925—26 888 67 955 643 312 35
1926—27 985 129 1,115 742 373 38
1927—28 971 46 1,017 678 339 35
1928—29 926 92 1,018 687 331 36
1929—301,053 14 1,067 750 317 30
1930—31 1,069 2 1,071 691 380 36
1931—32 1,278 37 1,315 838 477 37
1932—33 1,195 8 1,203 613 590 49
1933—34 1,298 1 1,299 578 721 56
1934—35 1,303 1 1,304 662 642 49
1935—36 1,365 1 1,366 683 683 50
1936—371,319 1 1,320 628 692 52
1937—38 1,402 2 1,404 708 696 50
1938—391,307 1 1,308 722 586 45
1939—401,129 13 1,142 719 423 37
Average
1910—li to






























57 937 664 273
7 1,274 684 590 47Technical Change and Agricultural Trade 467
Notes to Table 111.10
Source:Taiwan Provincial Food Bureau, Taiwan Food Statisrics, = Taipei,1965 (and earlier issues).
as aThe rice year in Taiwan is November 1to October 31 for years
.t of prior to 1945. This was changed to July 1to June 30 in 1945.
ion
eral price level, and Tables 111.4 and Tables 111.5 indicate that rice
prices rose to their highest relative level in 1913 and their highest
absolute level in 1919. The wholesale price of rice in Tokyo more than
doubled between 1913 and 1919, and there were consumer riots during
the very sharp price rise of 1916—19. As a response to the riots, official
policies were designed to encourage rice production in and imports
from the colonial areas.
Japanese imports increased sharply in the mid-1920's and remained
above 1.2 million metric tons until after 1940 (Table 111.12). From
1921 to 1940, the price of rice did not resume its upward drift relative
to the general price level but fluctuated below the peak established in
1913. The sharp decline in rice prices in the early 1930's led to protests
by farmers against imports. The government limited imports from the
two colonial areas in 1933 and again in1936. Nevertheless, rice
imports averaged 1.9 million metric tons in the period 1932—38 and
reached their pre-Worid War II peak of 2.2 million metric tons in 1938.
The impact of rice imports from Taiwan and Korea on rice produc-
tion, consumption, and prices in Japan during the interwar period
depends upon the shape of the rice demand and supply functions in
Japan during this period. Estimates of the price elasticity of demand
computed by Ohkawa from (1) data on rice consumption by income
classes between 1931—32 and 1938--39 and (2) from data on markets
between 1920 and 1938 center around —0.20 [32]. Recent income
elasticity estimates, summarized by Kaneda, also appear consistent with
a price elasticity for rice of —0.20 in the 1920—40 period [22].
Estimates of supply elasticities in rice production are unavailable
for Japan. The elasticity of supply depends on both the response of
area planted and the response of yield per unit area to changes in the
price of rice. Recent reviews of area supply elasticity studies conducted
in other Asian countries indicate that the area response to changes in
the price of rice typically falls in the +0.20 to +0.30 range [23, 24].468 Case Studies
TABLE 111.11
I
Korean Rice Production and Exports to Japan: Annual
Averages 1912—16, 1917—21, 1922—26




1912—16 1,771 152 85
1917—21 2,030 316 15.6
1922—26 2,088 625 29.9
Source:Ki Zum Zo [ist p. 315.
The yield of rice per unit area in Japan was apparently highly responsive
to the use of fertilizer, insecticides, and other technical inputs during
this period. Estimates of the production function and the demand for
fertilizer by Hayami imply an elasticity of yield with respect to price of
between +0.20 and +0.25 [13, 14]. It seems reasonable, therefore, to
hypothesize a total supply elasticity for rice of approximately +0.50 in
Japan between 1920 and 1940.
With these two elasticity estimates it is possible to arrive at an esti-
mate of the impact of rice imports on Japanese rice production, con-
sumption, and price by constructing three simple economic models for
the 1921—40 period.
Notesto Table111.12
Source:Japan—Hundred YearStatistics of the Japanese Economy,
Tokyo,1966.Taiwan—Taiwan FoodStatistics,1965 (andearlier
issues), Taiwan Provincial Food Bureau. Taipei. The Taiwan data
represents per capita supply available for domestic utilization rather
than per capita consumption. Korea_Chosen Beikoku Yoran (Rice
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TABLE 111.12
Per Capita Annual Consumption of Rice in Japan,











1910 162.6 — —
1911 147.0 —
1912 160.2 .— 115.9
1913 158.0 -- 104.8
1914 147.2 — 100.8
1915 166.7 — 110.0
1916 101.0 — 01.0
1917 168.9 — [08.0
1918 171.5 — 102.0
1919 168.6 — 108.7
1920 167.7 192.4 95.1
1921 173.0 [54.2 [00.0
1922 165.0 185.5 95.1
1923 173.0 134.9 97.1
1921 16S.3 . [55.6 90.5
1925 169.2 166.7 77.8
169.5 153.1 79.9
1927 164.3 173.0 78.7
1928 169.4 151.5 S 1.0
1929 165.0 195.3 06.9
1931) 161.4 162.5 67.6
1931 167.7 145.7 78.0
1932 151.8 172.2 61.8
1933 162.5 [22.8 61.5
1934 170.0 112.7 62.5
19.35 151.1 126,0 58.2
1936 157.1 126.8 58.2 85.2
1937 166.7 [13.6 — 105.5
1938 166.8 124.6 — 116.4
























(production, import, and supply figures in thousands of metric tons)




1921 9,4S1 671 10,152 83 559 10,040
1922 8,277 1,024 9,301 97 559 S,S35
1923 9,104 S25 9,929 88 559 9,663
1924 8,317 U;313 9,630 100 559 S,S76
1925 8,575 1,525 10,100ill 559 0, 134
1026 8,955 1,348 10,303 113 559 9,515
1927 8,339 1,706 10,045 112 559 S,S98
1928 9,316 1,537 10,853 97 559 9,874
1929 9,045 1,253 10,298 94 559 9,604
1930 8,933 1,207 10,140 72 559 9,493
1931 10,031 1,429 11,460 86 559 10,590
1932 8,252 1,639 9,921 89 559 8,841
1933 9,058 1,819 10,877 7S 559 9,617
1934 10,625 1,997 12,622 93 559 11,183
1935 7,776 1,833 9,600 104 559 8,335
1936 8,619 2,047 10,666 103 559 9,177
f937 10,101 1,685 11,786 89 559 10,660
1938 9,948 2,203 12,151 90 559 10,507
1939 9,S80 1,357 11,237 88 559 10,439
1940 10,345 1,533 l1,S7S 92 559 10,904
Average
1921—30 S,S34 1,241 10,075 92 559 9,303
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on
Model 1 PartittlIsoldtionModel 11 Isolation Model
Price Price Price
index0ProductionImportsSupplyindex0Pruductionbindex0
SS 9,559 559 10,118 SI 9,951 91
121 8,598 559 9,357 105 S,963 114
100 551) 9,818 9,679 99
139 8,832 559 9,391 112 9,214 122
164 9,250 559 9,809 129 9,612 13S
156 9,495 559 10,054 127 9,S79 136
176 9,113 559 9,672 133 9,490 143
140 9,9S3 559 10,542 111 10,364 119
125 9,522 559 l0,OS1 104 9,906 112
95 9,379 559 9,938 79 9,764 85
IIS 10,62S 559 11,1S7 96 11,012 103
137 9,012 559 9,571 105 9,390 113
123 9,909 559 10,468 93 10,287 99
116 11,600 559 12,159 110 ll,97S 117
173 8,629 559 9,1S8 127 9,002 137
175 9,614 559 10,173 127 9,9SS 1:36
131 10,869 559 11,42S 103 11,250 109
150 11,052 559 11,611 110 1 1,428lii
119 10,429 559 10,9SS 98 l0,S13 105
129 11,013 559 11,572 104 11,395 Ill
130 9,302 559 9,358 lOS 9,684 11€
140 10,276 559 10,332 lOT 10,654 115472 CaseStudies
The first model, identified in Table 111.13 as "partial isolation model
(I)," illustrates the impact of imports on rice prices when (1) annual rice
domestic production is the same as it actually was in the period 1921 to
I-Jo,
1940 (implying a completely inelastic supply function), (2) imports
are held at the 1912—20 average level, and (3) the price elasticity of dat
demand is assumed to be —0.20. Under these conditions rice prices
would have risen to an average index of 140 for the 1931—40 period,
44 per cent higher than the actual average index of 97 that prevailed ec
during 1931—40. an
The second model, identified as "partial isolation model (II)," illus- re\1
trates the impact on rice prices when (1) the price elasticity of supply dud
is assumed to be +0.50, (2) imports are held at the 1912—20 average rea4
level, and (3) the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be —0.20. nofl
It differs from model (I) only in the assumption with respect to supply tria
elasticity. Under these conditions, rice prices would have risen to an of .1
average index of 107 for the 1931—40 period, 10 per cent higher than redi
the actual average index for the same period. COfl
The third model, called the "isolation model," illustrates the esti- sect
mated impact of imports on rice prices, production, and consumption 1
when (1) imports are assumed to have been prohibited in the period
from 1921 to 1940, (2) the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be
—0.20, and (3)theprice elasticity of supply is assumed to be +0.50.
Under these conditions the average 193 1—40 price index would be 115. oft
This is 19 per cent above the actual 1931—40 index of 97. ch3
The prices generated by the "isolation model" are consistent with an Tai
estimated rate of growth in rice production in Japan equal to that exIl
achieved during the first two decades of this century.3° The "isolation tiolt
model" is, therefore, consistent with the hypothesis referred to at the effd
beginning of this section that imports of rice from Taiwan and Korea
were responsible for the depressed rice prices and the slow growth of
Theactual average rate of rice production growth in the period between
1900—03 and 19 19—22 was 1.3 per cent per year. The "isolation model" suggests
a similar growth rate of 1.3 per cent for the 1919—22 to 1937—40 period when pa
imports were presumed to be prohibited. The actual production growth rate was
1.1 per cent per year in the presence of imports from other nations. Years before
h 1900 were omitted from this comparison in order to avoid the data problems J
raisedby Nakamura [27, 28]. a
vig
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iodel rice production in metropolitan Japan during the period 1920—40.3'
nual However, the data and analysis presented in this paper are inadequate to
11 to reject the hypothesis that technical considerations also could have
ports dampened the rate of growth of output even if the calculated equilibrium
ty of prices had been obtained.
rices The impact of the rice imports from Taiwan and Korea on Japanese
nod, economic growth is less obvious than their impact on rice production
ai e and prices. Clearly one major impact of these rice imports was to
11
reverse the long-run tendency of the terms of trade to favor rice pro-
US-
ducers by turning it to favor rice consumers. This contributed to higher
real incomes for urban consumers increased the supply of labor in the rage
20 nonfarm sector, and reduced pressures for wage increases in the rndus-
trial sector. One effect was probably to increase the competitive position
ofJapanese industrial exports in world markets. A second effect was to an
reduce the growth rate of purchasing power in rural areas. This, in turn,
contributed to the slack in domestic private demand for the industrial
esti- sector's output [10, pp. 419—42].
tion The transfer of rice-production technology from Japan to Taiwan and
nod Korea and the Japanese policy on imports from these two countries dur-
be ing the period 1920—40 have important implications for South and South-
50 east Asian countries for the rest of this century. Approximately two-thirds
15 of the world rice trade today is between Asian countries [2]. Technical
change in rice production, similar to the changes that took place in
an Taiwan and Korea prior to World War II, is underway in several rice-
that exporting and importing nations of Southeast Asia. Substantial disrup- /
tion tions of trade and price relationships are anticipated in the absence of an
the effective international stabilization scheme.
area
of JV. SUMMARY
'een We recognize that it is difficult to draw broad inferences about future
patterns of international generation and transmission of technology in
was
'ore
31Theresults presented here should be treated more as the statement of a
ems hypothesis than as a final conclusion. Work is currently underway by Yujiro
Hayami and V. W. Ruttan to test the colonial trade import hypotheses more
vigorously.474 Case Studies
agricultural products from the evidence in these three cases. However,
we will summarize the common elements that we see in them. We will
also draw on this and other related work in making some tentative
inferences regarding future patterns of international technical change tee
agricultural products.
Technical change inallthree cases was generated by organized ne
research effort—the more advanced the basic technology, the more
h
highly organized the effort. Early sugarcane breeding, for example, was
sometimes accomplished on individual plantations. Virtuallyallthe
a
major canes, however, were the product of experiment station research.
inf
The Stage-IV varieties were all produced by scientists using advanced
we
techniques and working inwell-organizedresearchestablishments.
ab
Similarly, advances in rice breeding were and are being produced by
experiment stations established for this purpose, and the advances in
banana production were generated by researchers working with large
private organizations."
stag
Research accomplishments have in many cases followed concentrated I
effortto solve specific economic problems. The accomplishments in the
banana case can be traced to the effort put forth in response to the
problems caused by Panama disease. Later, the problems associated
with handling and processing the new disease-resistant varieties led to tha
improved methods in that area. The history of sugarcane breeding reveals toq
many instances in which a disease problem was the basis for a sustained of
effort to find new disease-resistant, higher-yielding varieties. tud
The international transmission of technical change is a function of
both the specific characteristics of the technology and of economic ar
incentives. The technological characteristics that appear to be most
important are the sorts of information or knowledge required to insert
the technology into the actual production processes. The simplest tech-
nology from this point of view might be a new higher-yielding crop infl
variety which is adapted to a wide range of climate and soil conditions
and does not require any changes in producing, processing, or market- efil
ing techniques. Some of the early transfer of sugarcane varieties was of
del "Interms of the sugarcane terminology, the banana-breeding effort would be vid
classified as Stage-I research since it involved the selection of natural varieties.
I
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this sort. Only the economic incentive of profitability was needed to
ver, encourage rapid international transmission of these varieties.
Information is needed for international transmission even when the
live technology is embodied simply in the seed of a plant variety. A grower
e in must have some information about the relative yield and quality of a
new variety before he can determine whether a change is profitable.
ized This information was relatively easy to obtain for those sugarcane
iore varieties which were adapted to wide climatic and soil conditions, thus
was Stage-I! sugarcane varieties were transferred relatively easily.
the But the transmission of technology becomes more difficult as more
rch. information is required. For example, the Stage-Ill sugarcane varieties
ced were not easily transferred because specific information was needed
(its, about the diseases to which each of the new varieties was resistant. (A
similar amount of information was required on the banana diseases.)
in Rapid transmission of technology based on this degree of information
irge took place only through the organized testing effort of experiment
stations or of large private concerns.
Transmissionisfurther complicated when knowledge isrequired
the regarding new production, processing, and marketing techniques. So
the that, in addition to organized research effort, some form of extension
ted effort often is required to achieve transmission of new technology. In
•to the banana case, the solution to the processing and marketing problems
took the form of an important new technical advance. The transmission
of rice varieties from Japan to Korea involved knowledge of new cul-
tural practices.
of The most complicated and sophisticated forms of technical transfer
• nic are those illustrated by the Stage-IV sugarcane breeding effort and the
ost transfer of rice technology from Japan to Taiwan. In these cases, the
ert technology that was transferred was not directly embodied in a tangible
input such as a plant seed. It took the form of knowledge or scientific
op information regarding plant-breeding techniques.
)ns Technology transfer of this kind depends heavily on the existence of
et- effective research organizations and requires a minimum number of
of competent research scientists committed to the transfer and further
development of the technology. In addition, the organization must pro-




change of knowledge by scientists within the nation and internationally.
One would expect to find the lag or "technology gap" that exists
between the most advanced technology used in the production of a given
th
crop and the least advanced technology to be related to the difficulty
of international transmission. Thus, in cases in which the technology is
embodied in an input and where little information is needed to deter-
bej
mine the profitability of that input, the lag should be relatively short.
ac
We would expect the longest lag and the widest technology gap to exist
a
in those agricultural products in which the transfer of information and
knowledge is in the "Stage-IV" level. Agricultural development, at the
present time, appears to confirm this expectation.
b
Technology transfer of the easiest sort appears to have been limited
de
to relatively few agricultural commodities. For a few countries, technical
change in sugarcane, rice, and a number of the tropical crops has been tr'
transferred with limited research activity. In a few additional cases, such
as the spread of open-pollinated corn in Thailand, the transfer has
involved some extensive activity including added investments in clear-
ing, draining, and irrigating new lands.
However, for most major crops the transfer depends on the existence
of research organizations capable of performing Stage-I V-type research.
Generally, research organizations with this capability are scarce in the
less-developed economies. Exceptions in sugarcane and bananas have
been noted. The rice-breeding effort in Taiwan and research efforts in
other tropical crops are also exceptions.
The technology gap for many of the major feeds and food grains
exists largely because good Stage-IV research organizations do not exist
yet in many less-developed countries. This gap has been widened as the
rese arch organizations of the developed countries have continuously
sid
generated new technology and technical change which have not been
transferred to the less-developed countries. teQ
The efforts of the developed countries, particularly the United States,
to foster the transmission of agricultural technology to the less-developed C1
nationshave not been particularly successful. Where the United States
government has failed, however, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations m4
have partially succeeded.33 The Rockefeller program in Mexico and the
Theeconomic development effortsassociated with the foreign aid and
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IY. International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines are
Sts examples of the kinds of research organizations which are essential if
the technology gap is to be closed.
ity In addition to the Mexican and IRRI programs, a number of other
is efforts are underway. It appears that Stage-IV research activity is now
being activated on a much broader basis. We would expect this research
it activity effort to result in a narrowing of the present technology gap
1st and to stimulate a "catching-up" phase by the less-developed econo-
nd mies.34
he World trade and individual country gains from trade are, or course,
both influenced by this catching-up phase. It is difficult to speculate in
detail about the specific shifts in trade, but evidence from the three cases
al in this paper clearly indicates that shifts in technology levels do affect
trade patterns. We expect that the less-developed countries, for example,
will become more self-sufficient in the production of certain feed and
as food grains, and that some of the major importers among less-developed
nations may shift to an export status in the relatively near future. The
food aid and surplus-disposal programs of the United States, Canada,
Ce and Western Europe probably will be reexamined as many of the devel-
oping countries expand their own food production with newly developed
technologies.
we This catching-up phase due to the international transmission of tech-
Ifl nology generally should result in an improvement in the welfare position
of the less-developed countries as they become more competitive in
is world markets. Those develope4 countries which are presently exporters
enjoying a long lead in technology will probably experience a decline in
their competitive position. We do not see serious over-all welfare con-
siderations arising from this change since it represents improvement
technical assistance programs of the United States have, until recently, given
agricultural development low priority. The viewpoint was that the key to economic
growth is the development of industrial and urban service sectors, even at the
expense of agriculture. This policy of attempting to develop an economy by making
it look like a developed economy has not been particularly successful. As interest
now turns to searching for "cheap sources of growth" or high-payoff investments,
more attention is being paid to the agricultural sector. The establishment of first-
me rate Stage-IV research stations is likely to be a very high-payoff investment in
most of the less-developed countries.
This development of an international technology gap followed by its later
reduction is not peculiar to agricultural products [30].-1
478 CaseStudies
in the welfare of poorer nations relative to rich nations. Nevertheless,
the pressure from producers in the developed countries for protectionist
trade policies to maintain present trade patterns and price levels will
probably be intensified.
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The paper by Evenson, Houck, and Ruttan is a valuable contribution
to our understanding of the forces influencing the success of the genera-
tion and international transfer of agricultural techniques. When Presi-
dent Truman announced the Point Four of his 1949 Inaugural Address,
the view was widely shared in America that we possessed a cheap
"technological fix" for the problems of poverty and backwardness which
beset most of the human race. We are, most of us, sadder and wiser
today. Of course opportunities exist for raising agricultural productivity
by the transfer of existing technology, but most of the very high payoffs
may very well have been exhausted. This paper, by focusing on the
historical experience of three major crops, provides important insights
into the opportunities and the constraints which confront policymakers.
Several factors stand out. First of all, the transfer of agricultural
techniques presents certain special difficulties because agricultural activ-
ity is always immersed, as manufacturing is not, in a unique ecological
environment. The success of an individual crop will often depend on a
single quality or a delicate combination of qualities of the natural
environment—topography, rainfall,sunlight, chemical composition of
soil, temperature variations. Therefore, each region and often each
subregion will have to develop, through on-the-spot research, optimal
adaptations to local ecological characteristics—as in the breeding of
disease-resistant, higher-yielding seed varieties. In most cases the transfer
of technology will therefore have to involve not specific tangible inputs,
such as a plant seed, but a knowledge of certain scientific principles and
techniques, such as genetics, biochemistry, and plant-breeding techniques.
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For most of the major crops, large-scale improvements in productivity
are going to be dependent on organizations capable of engaging in
research of a high scientific quality. In fact, one of the interesting find-
ings of this paper is that, in the case of the three crops, the research
efforts had to become more highly organized in an institutional sense as
G
the basic technology became more advanced. The authors conclude that
the highest payoff to American technical assistance programs overseas
may well be in the establishment of first-rate research organizations.
The discussion of the Japanese effort to raise Taiwan rice yields is
very illuminating in this regard. The direct transfer of Japanese tech-
niques failed due to ecological differences between Japan and Taiwan.
Success came only after Japanese technical skill was used to breed rice
varieties which conformed to the requirement of Taiwanese ecology. It
is worth noting that this transfer, which was eventually highly success-
ful, took fully twenty years to accomplish. It is also worth noting, if
only in passing, that agriculture's close involvement with nature has
another consequence which is significant in inhibiting acceptance of new
techniques: because of the importance of even minor variations in rain-
fall, diurnal rhythms, soil content, etc., there is an unusually high degree
of uncertainty concerning the outcome of untried agricultural techniques.
This paper makes it clear that the common practice of treating pro-
duction functions, involving similar inputs as identical and therefore
available to all—much as the information in a cookbook—is not a rea-
sonable characterization of the situation in world agriculture. Abstract
bodies of scientific knowledge, such as one finds in biology and genetics,
are in some sense available, but these bodies are not capable of direct
and easy translations into practical technical applications. One result is
that in the case of agriculture what we are calling the transfer of tech-
nology demands a very high order of talent and scientific training to
carry it out successfully—so high, in fact, that one is led to question
whether the terminology itself may not be misleading. This paper sug-
gests to me that what we are calling "transfer" (or "diffusion") often
involves activities which are very difficult to distinguish, in any mean-
ingful way, from what we ordinarily call "innovation."
A further point which is suggested by a reading of this paper, which
the authors do not stress, is the extreme importance of complementarities.
First, in order to apply fertilizers successfully to rice crops in southeast
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Asia,it has been necessary to breed new rice varieties possessing the
appropriate genetic capacities, and, second, the success of the new-
varieties-cum-fertilizer approach to higher rice yields has been heavily
dependent upon appropriate measures of water control. In addition, the
high cost of the required irrigation systems suggests that the gains
resulting from new varieties may not come as cheaply as had once been
expected. In any case, the whole subject of the exact nature of the
complementarities (including regional variations) between (1) new
seeds, (2) fertilizer inputs, (3) irrigation systems, and (4) other infra-
structure requirements, such as drainage, would seem to be one worthy
of a very high research priority. Indeed, it is difficult to see how intelligent
allocation decisions can be made in the absence of much more detailed
quantitative information than we now have concerning the response of
output to the whole range of possible input combinations.
This paper impresses me with the importance of complementarities in
a somewhat broader sense. It seems clear that the productivity of a
country's agricultural sector will frequently depend not only on resources
within that industry, but on the availability and the effectiveness of indus-
tries which stand in an important complementary relationship with it.
The growing role of a changing technology suggests the increasing
importance of the development of new technological inputs (including
pure knowledge) by industries outside the agricultural sector. Certainly
in the American experience the growth in agricultural productivity was
heavily dependent on the machinery sector which developed a whole
new mechanical technology appropriate to our special factor endow-
ment, as well as upon the fertilizer industry and upon new educational
institutions devoted to the study of such subjects as soil chemistry and
genetics. Rapidly changing technology makes it increasingly important
that we think in terms of such complementarities instead of in the more
static terms of resource endowment and comparative advantage.